Cleveland Cavaliers

Cleveland’s core edge is dual initiation with built-in counterpunches. When Mitchell is on the ball, Cleveland can run high spread pick-and-roll and punish Toronto’s point-of-attack defense with pace: reject the screen to get downhill, force the tag, then hit the weak-side spacer. When Harden takes over, the same set plays slower but becomes more surgical — Harden manipulates the low man and sells the pocket pass window before lifting the skip to the opposite corner. Different tempo, same outcome: Toronto’s help has to commit, and rotations arrive a half-beat late.

Mobley is the swing piece because he’s not just a rim runner. Cleveland repeatedly used him as a short-roll decision point: Harden snakes the screen, draws two to the level, then hits Mobley in the pocket. From there, Mobley’s touches weren’t static post-ups; they were advantage conversions — two dribbles to the rim against a backpedaling big, quick seals when Toronto switched a smaller onto him, and face-up drives when Toronto’s five had to show higher. That forces Toronto to choose between switching (and living with Mobley’s size/finish) or playing drop (and letting Mitchell/Harden walk into pull-up rhythm).

Toronto’s most viable answer is to load up early and “scram” out of mismatches, but Cleveland’s spacing punished the second helper. With two creators, Cleveland can keep a live dribble against the first rotation and still have a second handler on the floor to attack the closeout. Late game, the Cavs leaned into clock management — fewer risky early threes, more two-man actions to generate a controlled paint touch or free-throw attempt — which is why they could “hold on” without needing a barrage.